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The importance of the automotive industry in the global economy is widely recognised. The sector has
undergone enormous changes in order to prepare for the fierce competition of the 21st century. Among
these transformations, the most relevant are those technologies developed for the rapid evolution of
activities linked to new designs, new products, and new manufacturing processes and systems. Innovative
Japanese carmakers have stimulated international performance comparisons in these activities.
International technology alliances may be one way of gaining access to new competitive technologies.
Risks and costs associated with new product development can be shared among the partners and more
effective use can be made of manufacturing facilities and production capabilities. Sometimes, an alliance
agreement may lead to the deployment of new capabilities. However, in spite of this potential, the
literature presents the success rate of alliances at less than 50%.
Our study considers two examples of companies that developed international joint ventures (IJVs):
Rover with Honda, and Seat with Volkswagen. Since these two European peripheral companies, Rover
and Seat, no longer remain as independent firms, we are interested in identifying the reasons leading to
the success or failure of these IJVs as regards the New Product Development (NPD) process. In
particular, in both cases the paper looks at the problems of the weaker partner becoming increasingly
dependent on the other partner and the need for a well-defined strategy to benefit from IJVs.
1. Introduction
A fter the merger and acquisition boom of the1980s, the decade of the 1990s has been char-
acterised by the growth of strategic alliances and
international joint ventures (IJVs). In this sense,
Inkpen (1998, p. 224) estimates that the number of
strategic alliances formed has grown by more than
25% since 1990.
In the context of this article, the concept of strategic
alliance is defined as a ‘long-term co-operative arrange-
ment between two or more independent firms that engage
in business activities for mutual economic gain’ (Tsang,
1998, p. 209). Such an arrangement can prepare the
companies for competitive positioning (Sørensen and
Reve, 1998, p. 151), allowing them to gain sustained
competitive advantage vis-a`-vis their competitors out-
side the alliance (Jarillo, 1988). By joint venture (JV)
we imply a means of performing activities in combina-
tion with one or more firms instead of autonomously
(Inkpen and Crossan, 1995, p. 595). We will limit our
research to the concept of strategic technology
partnering suggested by Hagedoorn and Narula
(1996), which involves contractual alliances covering
a relatively large group of partnerships, such as joint
development agreements, joint research programmes,
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cross licensing, second-sourcing agreements, mutual
second sourcing, and R&D contracts. Partners can co-
operate in certain areas, but they still compete with
each other in other areas (Hamel, 1991; Pucik, 1988);
such a context has been described by Schill et al. (1994,
p. 262) as a horizontal alliance scenery.
Although strategic alliances devoted to developing
new assets (technology) represent an important target
for research (Sørensen and Reve, 1998, p. 151), work
on strategic alliances and international joint ventures
has recently begun to address issues of organisational
learning, learning opportunities and renewal. (See
Anderson, 1990; Dogson, 1993; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen,
1995; 1998; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Inkpen and
Crossan, 1995; and Simonin and Helleloid, 1993, for
further detail.) Different authors, such as Teece and
Pisano, 1994; Hamel, 1991; Huber, 1991; Inkpen and
Crossan, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Ritcher and Vettel, 1995;
and Westney, 1988; have suggested that alliances may
be signed with the primary goal of learning from
partners, because both alliances and IJVs provide a
platform for organisational learning, giving access to
the skills and capabilities of the partners. Furthermore,
Grant and Baden-Fuller (1995) affirm that through
‘learning alliances’ firms can speed capability develop-
ment and minimise their exposure to technological
uncertainties by acquiring and exploiting knowledge
developed by others.
However, recent work on alliances and the role of
firms specificity knowledge in firm strategy (Mowery
et al., 1996, p. 78) suggest that firms use interfirm
collaboration to gain access to other firms’ capabilities,
supporting more focused, intensive exploitation of
existing capabilities within each firm. The implicit
requirement here is that one of the partners is
technologically stronger than the other, so that the
stronger, or ‘teacher’, would not learn too much from
the weaker, or ‘student’ firm. This means that one of
the partners, the ‘student’, is looking to the alliance for
some kind of organisational learning, while the other is
looking for other kind of outcomes. Some student
firms may decide to become and remain dependent on
the teacher firm, in the conviction that they would gain
progressive access to the teacher’s knowledge, in spite
of the fact that they may in fact have very limited
chances to continue learning through the alliance.
So far, international technology alliances may be
one option to gain access to new competitive technol-
ogies. Risks and costs associated with new product
development can be shared among the partners and
more effective use can be made of manufacturing
facilities and production capabilities. Sometimes, an
alliance agreement may lead to the deployment of new
capabilities. However, in spite of this potential, the
literature presents the success rate of alliances at less
than 50%. Our study considers two examples of
companies that developed international joint ventures
(IJVs): Rover with Honda, and Seat with Volkswagen.
Since these two European peripheral companies, Rover
and Seat, no longer remain as independent firms, we
are interested in identifying the reasons leading to the
success or failure of these IJVs as regards the New
Product Development (NPD) process. In particular, in
both cases the paper looks at the problems of the
weaker partner becoming increasingly dependent on
the other partner, and the need for a well-defined
strategy to benefit from IJVs.
The article is organised as follows. We introduce in
Section 2 the state of the art and suggest a research
question. In Section 3 we consider the Rover and Seat
cases, including a parsimonious description of the
contents of both alliances. Section 4 is devoted to
analyse and compare the results of the alliances.
Managerial implications and suggestions for future
research are provided in Section 5.
2. State of the art and research question
Savary (1995, p. 149) has described the challenges
faced by European and American car manufacturers in
the 1980s. First, since the demand grew more slowly,
competition became more acute. Secondly, products
and process innovations led to changes in the
competitive priorities, increasing the concern for high-
er quality and lower costs and prices. Thirdly, the surge
of the Japanese firms with their ‘lean approaches’ to
production and operations management. As a conse-
quence, the European automobile production system
saw a major change in the eighties (Hudson and
Schamp, 1995, p. 224).
The automobile producers operating in Europe,
willing to increase size, reduce costs and improve
competitiveness, followed two strategic responses in
the late eighties. First, they tried to increase their R&D
and manufacturing activities, in order to acquire
quality levels similar to those of their Japanese
competitors, as well as to reduce the costs. Second,
they reinforce the development of international co-
operation agreements as a means of increasing
efficiency. It was done either through direct invest-
ments and exports, or by signing strategic alliances.
These agreements could involve European firms, like
Renault and Volvo in 1990, aiming at reaching
economies of scale, but they were also oriented at
enlarging the product range, with new specialised
vehicles and new key components, such as engines or
transmissions and=or new car models. The 1982
agreement between Seat and Volkswagen can be
considered a prototype of this approach. In spite of
the fact that it was unusual to sign agreements with the
Japanese as a route to learning about their manufac-
turing approaches – like lean production – Rover
signed an agreement of this kind with Honda.
Glaister and Buckley (1996, p. 304) have proposed
several reasons to explain why strategic alliances have
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become so trendy in the automotive industry (See
Table 1). Firstly, the production process in the
automobile sector is characterised by economies of
scale and learning by doing; thus, firms may attempt to
reduce costs expanding out to achieve these benefits.
Strategic alliances allow firms in the same industry to
rationalise production while avoiding the uncertainties
and difficulties of full-scale merger (Mariti and Smiley,
1983; Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Secondly,
strategic alliances may be used as a defensive ploy to
reduce competition (Harrigan, 1985). Alternatively,
linking with a rival in order to put some pressure on
the profits and market share of a common competitor
may use an alliance as an offensive strategy. Thirdly,
the alliance formation may help firms to move to new
foreign markets and to the development of either a
multi-domestic or global strategy (Gannon, 1993). In
fourth place, the alliances may be used to bring
together complementary skills and talents that cover
different aspects of the know-how needed in high
technology industries, as well as the necessary manu-
facturing, scale and distribution outlets.
These proposals are complementary to the sugges-
tions of Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) who have
demonstrated that international strategic technology
partnering in high-tech industries appears to be
disproportionately organised through contractual ar-
rangements, whereas other sectors with lower levels of
technological sophistication have a higher share of joint
venturing. The automotive industry occupies an inter-
mediate situation between high and medium technolo-
gical levels; thus, the probability of finding joint
ventures and contractual agreements is very high. Due
to that peculiarity, Kobayashi (1988) suggested the
relationships between the need for continual updating of
the car makers capabilities and the strategic alliances as
facilitators of this up-to-date. More recently, Hayes et
al. (1996) have proposed that this trend is also strongly
related to the aim of building skills in new market
sectors, such as the small cars in the USA, or the four-
wheel drive, leisure vehicles, in Europe.
The outstanding problem is that strategic learning
horizontal alliances may involve a high risk of
instability, partly due to the array of diverse situations
that may happen. For instance, one of the partners
may have a limited incentive to share its knowledge if
such sharing could potentially lead to the creation of a
competitor, as suggested by Inkpen (1998, p. 225).
These situations are constrained to what has been
termed by Schill et al. (1994, p. 262) as ‘pre-
competitive’ activities. There is also the risk that one
partner may acquire knowledge that it lacked at the
time of the alliance formation, and as soon as this
knowledge is acquired, such a partner may decide to
cease the joint venture. It might happen as well that a
dependent relationship develops, as the weaker partner
(i.e. the one with less developed knowledge) does not
learn as expected and this fact prevents it from reacting
on time to the increasing pace of new products and
processes innovations that its partner and competitors
are developing.
This late situation can be the final result of what
Nakamura et al. (1996) has described as ‘divergent
development’, i.e., partners decline technological over-
lap, so that the alliance is meant as a vehicle for
accessing rather than acquiring capabilities. In the
short term, the alliance appears to be the cheapest way
to source investments in R&D processes, NPD
activities, etc. and such sequential but scarce access
to knowledge could be considered by the student firms
as an enabler of their future independence from the
teacher partner. However, by proceeding this way, the
student firms may lose ‘the required level of self-
awareness to quickly react to the market forces that
inevitably rode the combined strategic value of their sets
of capabilities’ (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998, p. 474).
Consequently, it is very likely that these firms will
compromise their chances of developing effective new
capabilities on its own and they will probably be
unable to identify their future best-qualify teachers.
Thus, in this article we try to demonstrate that
weaker partners willing to achieve a sustainable
Table 1. Alliances in the automobile industry prior to 1986.
Firm Joint venture Procurement
Volkswagen (Germany) (includes Audi) Seat, Nissan
PSA (France) (Includes Peugeot and Citro¨en) Renault, Volvo
Renault (France) PSA
Rover (U.K.) Honda
General Motors (USA) (includes Opel, Vauxhall) Toyota, Daewoo Nissan
Ford (USA) (includes Ford Europa)
Chrysler (USA)
Toyota (Japan) General Motors
Nissan (Japan) Alfa Romeo General Motors, Volkswagen
Mitsubishi (Japan) Daimler Benz
 European Company
Source: Burgner, 1986
# Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999 R&D Management 29, 4, 1999 393
Strategic alliances, learning and NPD
3
competitive advantage should try to acquire a specific
knowledge, and develop a thorough understanding of
its own knowledge, i.e. the processes by which it
converts knowledge to capabilities, and the ability of
these capabilities to meet the demands of its environ-
ment, instead of limiting themselves to gain access to it
from their strong partners. We try to demonstrate as
well that clearly stated corporate strategies can be of
enormous help when trying to avoid the trap of
become dependent from the stronger partners.
3. The research set and descriptions
In this section we explore the strategic alliances signed
by Rover and Seat with Honda and Volkswagen,
respectively, in the early 80s. They can be considered
two examples of horizontal alliances, where two
technologically weak companies looked for gaining
access to the skills and knowledge of stronger partners.
Different researches have claimed that the complex-
ity of strategic alliances and IJVs has been a major
obstacle for their studies. Looking for a reasonable
solution to such a problem, we have used multiple
sources of data as a means of gaining a more complete
picture of the phenomenon we are looking at. The first
source of data is one in-depth case study of Seat,
developed by A´lvarez and Gonza´lez (1997) and
conducted between 1993 and 1997. This case was
confronted with international literature on the Rover
case. We are particularly in debt with Pilkington
(1996, 1998), whose research work gave us access to a
very well documented knowledge on the British
company. He prepared the Rover case using data
gathered from public sources, action research and
interviews conducted between 1987 and 1994 (Pilk-
ington, 1996b), when the company was finally acquired
by BMW and the Honda relationship ended.
A second source of data generated additional
support for the importance of the research questions.
This data source is longitudinal and it is related to a
former project initiated by one of the authors
(Gonza´lez, 1998). He has studied the complete
evolution of Seat from its early days till 1996,
analysed the company reports and accounts, and
interviewed significant representatives of the former
Spanish firm. He has also checked the Seat financial
figures against those shown by the other automobile
producers operating in Spain along the 1982–1992
period. The idea of studying a longitudinal data
source was inspired by Doz (1996) and Geringer and
Hebert (1991) suggestions. They complain that, in
spite of the relevance of the effects of technological
dependence, the available literature lacks of a clear
view of the way in which capabilities and strategies
are conditioned by the historical development of the
parties concerned.
3.1. Rover and Seat
3.1.1. Rover. As it has been described by Barrie
(1995), Bertodo (1990), Hudson and Schamp (1995),
Pilkington (1996a,b, 1998), and Schill et al. (1994),
among others, we have to look at the historical
development of the firm to understand the reasons
which led Rover to enter the relationship with Honda.
In the first years of the decade of the seventies, most of
Rover’s products lines were outdated and unprofitable
and its dimension was not adequate to benefit from scale
economies, making it quite difficult for the carmaker to
react to European and Japanese competitors. Austin
Rover had the skills and resources to develop replace-
ment models, but its programmes to replace its ageing
models were behind schedule. After the merger of the
majority of the British motor industry, i.e. Austin,
Morris and Leyland, in 1973, the ‘new’ company was
renamed British Leyland Motor Company (BLMC),
and it was expected that this merger would allow to cut
costs and retain market share (Pilkington, 1998, p. 2).
Nevertheless, BLMC was unable to match the R&D
levels of its main competitors: Ford UK and Vauxhall
(GM). Suffering from strong financial problems, the
firm invited the Government to intervene and the group
was nationalised in December 1974.
The Ryder Plan Report, a Parliamentary study
dated 1975, pointed out several important problems in
BLMC, such as out-dated machinery and facilities,
weak organisational structure and lack of a common
rational plan for all merged plants. In 1977 a new
name, BL, was given to the firm and a new Managing
Director, Michael Edwardes was appointed; his main
task was to rationalise the models and markets of the
company. The rationalisation exercise led to close
down Speke and Seneffe in Belgium, as well as to
dismantle some production lines at Cowley, and the
Land Rover and Range Rover plant at Solihull. It
implied to halve the production volume between 1977
and 1980. Furthermore, the plant near Oxford was
reorganised to manufacture upper and medium cars.
One challenging task was to radically change the bad
reputation of the vehicles (poor quality and reliability)
and to renew the product range. It seemed a difficult
task to be accomplished, since the design resources
were very much chaotically mixed and had been cut in
the belief that high volume manufacturing would
become the solution for BL. Under such scenery, the
new managing director considered that a Japanese
partner would be much more convenient than a
European, and BL and Honda did at least have
something to offer each other (Pilkington, 1998, p. 3).
The 1979 deal with Honda was intended to provide a
car model to produce for two or three years while the
Montego=Maestro design was being completed. As
Pilkington (1998, p. 3) emphasises, ‘Honda had design
strengths in just the areas that had been allowed to let
slip under the BL reorganisations: engines and gear-
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boxes. BL, for its part, had European design studios,
which would improve the styling of the Japanese
products and make them more attractive to customers
both at home and abroad. Honda’s strength of organisa-
tion and efficient methods of production, together with
the products themselves, were also seen by Edwardes as
desirable role models to follow’.
3.1.2. Seat Seat started its activity in 1950. Its
shareholders were several Spanish banks and Fiat,
the Italian carmaker; this firm occupied several
positions at the advisory board, provided the Spanish
company with the required process technology and
technical assistance, and gave the licences for the
manufacturing of the Spanish versions of the Fiat
models. It was not until 1967 that Seat began to be
concerned about its lack of strategic planning and its
corresponding weaknesses in the technical and organi-
sational infrastructure. To make things worse for Seat,
the Spanish Government changed the regulatory
framework in 1972, facilitating the opening by Ford
of a factory near Valencia, wherein the Ford Fiesta
model was manufactured.
Between 1974 and 1979, Seat’s share of the Spanish
market declined from a 51.2% in 1974 to a 29.94% in
1979. Along this five-year period, the company con-
centrated most of its efforts in the manufacturing and
distribution of the Seat 127 model (A´lvarez and
Gonza´lez, 1997). However, there was so much idle
manufacturing capability that Seat managers considered
that marketing activities would have to be reinforced, so
that manufacturing capacity could be fully used. But the
export figures suffered a continuous decline: Seat was
not fully integrated in a multinational firm, and it
lacked all capabilities related to R&D and New Product
and Process Development. Then, Seat asked Fiat for
financial help and technical support. The Italian
company was facing important internal troubles (Conti
and Enrietti, 1995) and it refused to maintain its share in
Seat. So far, by 1981 the publicly owned Spanish
holding, INI,1 took care of Seat and Fiat ended its
relationship. Table 2 summarises these facts. Seat was
not competitive at all, since it needed (i) to reduce its
costs; (ii) to increase quality levels, (iii) to build the
capabilities related to product variety and readiness for
model changes, (iv) to increase customer satisfaction
levels and to renew the product-mix.
These problems were well known by Seat executives
and were reflected in the (1982–1986) Corporate
Strategic Plan. Its long- term objectives were formulated
as:
* to continuously keep an up-dated products range;
* to launch new models, easy to export to both South
America and Europe;
* to develop two new models, completely designed
and engineered by Seat, known as the models Ibiza
and Ma´laga; and
* to launch new models, renewed versions of already
existing Volkswagen vehicles, like the Polo model
and its versions, and the Passat and Variant models.
3.2. The alliances and the development of new
products
3.2.1. Rover and Honda. An analysis of the portfolio
of Rover products provides evidence of its reliance on
Honda for design and development programmes (see
Table 3). The 800, 600, 400 and 200 series belong to the
period of the joint development with Honda. Pilk-
ington (1998, p. 9) affirms that Rover could produce
the ageing Metro and Mini models independently; the
problem was that these models were relatively un-
profitable and they did not represent a means of
securing Rover’s future; only the Rover 100, manu-
factured by Rover, kept a promise of a profitable,
independent future. In fact Rover failed to post any
significant returns during its relationship with Honda
(see Table 4), and as Pilkington (1998, p. 7) remarks,
‘when Rover has made little or no cash surplus for the
last twenty years, the rate and extent to which new
models can be replaced and redesigned is limited’.
Apart from that issue, it should be noticed that the
influence of Honda-designed models on the Rover’s
reputation for reliability and quality was radical,
notably improving its brand image. As far as
productivity levels are concerned, not all Rover’s
facilities experienced the same changes in their
production processes, which help to explain why
productivity figures diverge across the plants. After
several mistakes and false economies in the early days,
mainly due to the difficulties of carrying on a full
replication of Honda Japanese facilities in the UK, the
Longbridge facility became a champion within Rover
of the Honda way. Solihull, the home of Land Rover
and Range Rover, has been little influenced by Honda,
whereas Cowley only produces Honda-derived pro-
ducts. While Longbridge follows a Toyota approach as
regards batch sizes and customers’ options, Cowley has
followed the approach of a mass producer, more
closely associated with the Honda manufacturing
approach.
As the venture grew and developed, Rover had come
to rely on Honda for the majority of its product
development activities (see the production figures in
Table 4) as well as the problems and successes of
Rover. It has maintained the core skills needed to
develop new vehicles, like the Rover 100, but it does
not have the financial resources to maintain vehicle
development across the full range (see the profit
trajectory in Table 4). In fact, the never-ending
financial problems led to its sale to British Aerospace
(BAe). This sale did not disturb the relationship with
Honda Motor, but on the contrary, the relative
financial stability strengthened it.
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Table 2. Main features of Rover and Seat before their respective alliances.
Rover Seat
Before
1973
1973
(BMLC) 1977 (BL) 1979 Alliance
1950 1972 ‘Quasi
Monopoly’
1974 1979
‘Competence’ 1981 INI 1982 Alliance
Facilities and
equipment
Outdated Outdated Downsizing Re organization Progressive
obsolescence
Progressive
obsolescence
Outdated Strong investments
Economies of scale No No Re organised Re organised Progressive lost of
focus
No No Re organised
(Focused mftg)
Product portfolio Outdated Outdated Outdated Two new models
from Honda
Too wide,
outdated, Fiat
models
Outdated, Fiat
models
Outdated, Fiat
models
Fiat and VW
models
R&D capabilities Some at
Austin
Eroded Eroded Refocused by
Honda
None None at all None at all Refocused by VW,
some section left to
Seat (Ibiza model)
Supply chain Local
suppliers,
No chain
Local
suppliers,
no chain
Local
suppliers, no
chain
Japanese British
Ring
Local suppliers, no
chain
Local suppliers,
no chain
Local suppliers,
no chain
German Spanish
ring
Quality levels Very low Very low Low Rising Very low Low Low Rising
Productivity figures Very low Very low Low Low Neutral Low Low Rising
Financial strengths=
weaknesses
Very weak Very weak Weak Injection from
Honda
Neutral Weak Relatively
strength
(injection from
INI)
Relatively strength
(injection from
INI)
Brand reputation Poor, but
helped by
domestic
proud
Poor Poor Rising quickly Poor, but helped
by domestic proud
Poor Poor Rising
Marketing strengths=
weaknesses
Neutral Neutral Neutral Reinforced by
Honda
Good knowledge
of market
Good knowledge
of both Spanish
and South
American
markets
Good
knowledge of
both Spanish
and South
American
markets
Good knowledge
of German,
Spanish and South
American markets
Leitmotiv Outdated,
fragmented
market
To cut
costs and
retain
market
share
To rationalise
models and
markets
To learn from
Honda how to
organise the
production, the
supply chain and
to faster the NPD
process
Every Spanish
family may have a
Seat car.
To increase
exports to
diminish idle
capacity
To become a
profitable
company with
international
links
To acquire NPD
and R&D
capabilities, to
develop good
relationships with
its partner
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Table 3. New product development at Rover Honda.
Rover 200 Rover 800 Rover 600
Triump Acclaim Rover 200 (1984)
Rover 200=400
(1990)
Rover 400 (Honda
Civic) 1995 Rover 800 Sterling (Honda Accord)
New model? License Partially (Honda
Ballade)
No Face lift of the
Rover 200=400
No (Honda
Legend)
Face lift of Rover
800
A Honda car with
interiors that
match the Rover
image
New components? Yes Yes Some engines
from the Rover
800, some diesel
engines.
New body styling
with mechanical
alterations
Large number of
parts were bought
to Honda, mainly
gearboxes and
engines
Large number of
parts were bought
to Honda, mainly
gearboxes and
engines
Huge investments
and serious
overcapacity
problems
Equipment and facilities New, bought to
Honda
Duplication of
Japanese facilities
Re organised by
Honda
Neutral Unfitted for the
high number of
versions
Unfitted for the
high number of
versions
Honda
Whose R&D? Honda’s Honda mostly and
Rover: mechanics
and 1600cc engines
Rover
concentrated all
its efforts in re
styling and
luxurious
appearance
Rover designed
new versions of the
K series engines
Honda mostly;
Rover designed the
2 litres engine
Honda
Economies of scale No No Rising (for
Honda)
Yes (for Honda) Yes (for Honda) No No
Quality levels Poor Poor Rising Rising Neutral Very poor Neutral
Supply chain Japanese UK ring Japanese UK ring Japanese in UK Japanese in UK Japanese in UK Japanese in UK Japanese in UK
Productivity figures Low Low Low Low Low Very low Low
Commercial success Yes Neutral=no Neutral Neutral Neutral Total failure Neutral
Financial figures Neutral=Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Very poor Poor
Brand reputation Rising Rising Neutral Neutral Neutral Decreasing Poor
International distribution
network
Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Poor Poor
 After the take over by BMW
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3.2.2. Seat and Volkswagen. The Spanish economic,
social, and political conditions of the early 1980s
discouraged any privatisation of Seat, but INI was
willing to get rid of it. Thus, Seat managers were
looking for alternatives to modernise the technological
base without altering the workforce scenery. It was not
an easy task and several potential allies were contacted,
such as the Japanese firms Nissan and Toyota. Finally,
Seat was able to reach an agreement with Volkswagen.
In 1982 Seat and Volkswagen signed their strategic
alliance, labelled as the ‘Acuerdo de Cooperacio´n
Industrial, Licencia y Asistencia Te´cnica’,2 which was
estimated to last seven years. Seat was not allowed to
manufacture Volkswagen vehicles until 1984, except
for some lot orders of the Passat and Variants models,
which would be manufactured at Zona Franca. From
1984 to 1988, Seat would manufacture the VW’s
models Passat, Santana and Variant. Table 5 shows
the continuous increasing pace of VW’s badge models
manufactured and imported by Seat. This strategy
allowed the company to amortise those fixed costs
related to the renewal of product and process
technologies, and reduced the manufacturing costs of
VW badge models. In addition it allowed the increas-
ing of exports from Germany to Spain and its influence
area. The size of the exportation network increased
from the 599 sale points of 1983 to the 2517 of 1987.
Seat improved its brand image almost immediately,
benefiting from the reputation of high quality and
reliability that the German vehicles have achieved.
Even the Seat logo (badge) was redesigned, as well as
the brand image transmitted and publicised to the
customers.
As a consequence of the strategic alliance, Seat
facilities underwent a profound transformation, that
included the upgrading of the workforce at the
Landaben and Zona Franca facilities, the modernisa-
tion of equipment and plants, and the re-organisation
of the supply chain. These changes were aimed at
enabling these facilities to manufacture the VW Polo
Classic and Coupe´ at Landaben, Pamplona. The Zona
Franca facility was dedicated in 1982 to the manu-
facturing of the Passat and Variant models. At the
same time, old Seat models, such as the Seat 131, 127
Fura, Panda, and Ronda, remained in the portfolio of
Seat until 1986, this meant that different process
technologies were being used simultaneously at Zona
Franca, leading to unbalanced productivity figures.
Table 6A summarises these facts.
Seat was able to launch two new models: the Ibiza
model in 1984, and the Ma´laga model in 1985. Only
the Ibiza model was a Seat car, because the Ma´laga
model was an adaptation of the VW Jetta. A´lvarez and
Gonza´lez (1997) affirmed that Seat had a very large
portfolio along the period 1983–86, showing a strategy
that clearly diverged from the one followed by its
competitors at the time. Instead of focusing on the
development of new cars, Seat R&D people started to
learn how to incorporate advances from VW models
into its newest models, searching for ways to improve
Table 4. The effects of the alliance on Rover’s fortunes.
Year
Turnover
(£M)
Profit= (loss)
(£M) Rover units Honda units
1981 2,869 (503) 367,875 20,447
1982 3,072 (300) 311,814 58,025
1983 3,421 (142) 383,141 50,042
1984 3,402 80 339,784 31,643
1985 3,415 (138) 385,048 65,844
1986 3,412 (892) 311,231 78,737
1987 3,096 (26) 313,436 137,290
1988 1,179# 35 304,605 145,970
1989 3,430 64 294,831 139,985
1990 3,785 55 229,775 187,576
1991 3,744 (52) 154,046 205,905
1992 3,684 (49) 122,400 216,654
Notes: excluding Land Rover; #part year figure from BAe Report.
Source: Adapted from Pilkington (1998, p. 8)
Table 5. The integration of Seat and VW production and marketing plans.
Car units manufactured and exported by Seat
(1984 1992)
Car models sold and imported by Seat for its domestic
market (1984 1992)
Year Seat VW
Exported
(Seat
badge)
Exported
(VW badge)
VW’s % of
total exports SEAT (1) VW Audi (2) TOTAL (1) (2)
Imported
VW Audi
units
1984 225.548 53.438 131.895 17.038 11.44% 128.334 22.360 150.694 1.730
1985 224.892 95.319 153.562 53.852 25.96% 85.923 42.968 128.891 5.759
1986 231.885 106.663 120.254 69.197 36.53% 99.866 39.383 148.434 9.185
1987 275.151 131.240 158.118 87.863 35.72% 123.867 39.894 187.529 23.768
1988 327.737 105.745 193.499 75.941 28.18% 131.238 87.947 219.185 55.028
1989 350.034 124.115 223.165 98.699 30.66% 125.419 113.839 239.258 65.035
1990 361.629 143.750 243.165 125.406 33.99% 118.778 96.901 215.679 71.308
1991 360.510 191.700 260.623 177.595 40.53% 97.198 81.757 178.955 56.233
1992 356.210 222.222 253.313 212.092 45.67% 102.208 80.546 182.754 65.430
Source: Gonza´lez (1998), compiled from Company Reports and Accounts
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Table 6A. New product development at Seat VW.
Fiat models Polo (WV) Ibiza (Seat) Ma´lga (Seat)
Panda Ritmo Polo Classic Coupe´ (1984) (1985)
New Model? No No No Yes Yes Yes Re styling of Jetta
VW
New components? No No No Yes Yes Yes No
Equipment and Facilities Outdated Outdated
overcapacity
Re organised by
VW
Re organised by
VW
Re organised by
VW
Re organised by
Seat and VW
Re organised by
VW
Whose R&D? FIAT engines
and Seat styling
FIAT engines
and Seat
styling
VW VW VW Seat VW
Economies of scale No No Yes (for VW) Yes (for VW) Yes (for VW) Yes for VW, rising
for Seat
Yes for VW and
Seat
Quality levels Poor Poor Rising Rising Rising Rising Rising
Supply chain Local, no chain Local, no chain German Spanish
ring
VW system VW system Seat VW systems VW supply system
Productivity figures Low Low Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral
Commercial success Yes Neutral Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Figures Poor Poor Neutral Neutral Neutral Good Good
Brand reputation Neutral Neutral Rising Rising Rising Good Good
International distribution
network
Good Good Good Good Good Good Good
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the manufacturing process and even the design of the
VW badge models manufactured in Spain.
3.3. The end of the alliances
In early 1994, BMW took over the majority of Rover.
According to Hudson and Schamp (1995, p. 236), the
merger opened new market segments to BMW, broad-
ening their product portfolio, mainly the small sized
cars (Mini, Rover 100) and the off-road vehicles
(Land Rover and Range Rover). From the production
and operations management point of view, it allowed
BMW to use its diesel motor in the Rover models, as
well as to achieve increasing economies of scale
through the shared use of body platforms, as in the
case of the BMW 5 and Rover 800. As a result of the
take-over Honda almost immediately decided to pull
out of its fifteen years partnership with Rover.
Two years into the agreement, in 1986, Volkswagen
decided to end its alliance with Seat and to acquire the
Spanish firm. Seat became the third member of the VW
Consortium, together with VW and Audi, enjoying
some autonomy to manage the distribution channels of
its own vehicles. From 1987 till 1990 Seat concentrated
all its R&D efforts in the re-styling of its Ibiza and
Ma´laga models (see Table 6B). The Landaben plant
was renewed in 1987 to manufacture the third face-lifts
of the VW Polo Coupe´, and new investments took
place in 1990 and 1991, to increase the manufacturing
capacity for Polo engines up to 1200 per day, and
vehicles, up to 1000 per day, respectively. In 1988
relevant investments were made in Zona Franca, aimed
at reducing the most relevant bottlenecks, and prepar-
ing the plant for the launch of the new model Toledo.
This new model combines the VW platform with a
‘Mediterranean’ design of its ‘hu¨t’. Something similar
took place in 1991 and 1992 with the Ibiza New Style,
and the Co´rdoba, respectively. A new state of the art
facility was built in 1993, known as the Martorell
plant, and the Zona Franca facility was closed down
very soon afterwards, moving the manufacturing of
both Seat cars and several badge models to Martorell.
During the eleven-year period after the end of the
alliance with VW Seat designers and engineers have
been able to design two new cars, developed from the
platform imposed by VW to all its Consortium
members. These cars are the Arosa model, launched
in 1997, and the ‘New Toledo’ model, launched in
1998. Seat has also participated in the design of the
Inca (1995) and Alhambra models (1996). We
consider these success as very relevant to our study,
since they show that Seat’s interest in developing new
models, as expressed by its 1983 Corporate Strategic
Plan, is finally coming to a happy end.
4. Analysis of the effects of the strategic
alliances
The two alliances that we analyse here are very similar
from the point of view that each of the ‘teacher’
partners had the same reasons to agree to having the
weaker firms as ‘student’ partners. Both Honda and
Volkswagen were seeking to expand its geographic
scope of operations, to achieve economies of scale and
to reinforce their links with their suppliers. This is why
Rover and Seat’s knowledge of local economic,
political, and cultural environments, as well as their
contact with the rings of domestic suppliers, were
considered an essential contribution to the success of
the joint venture.
They also coincide in that they were two nationalised
firms, technologically weak, which were looking for
alternatives to reinforce their R&D capabilities, and to
incorporate new models in their product portfolios, as
their last opportunity to survive in a hostile environ-
ment. Neither Rover, nor Seat, had access to a
continuous fund raising system that provided them
with the financial resources required to compete
successfully in the European car market of the eighties.
Table 6B. New product development at Seat, after its take over by WV
Year Launching of new models Designed and engineered by:
1987 3 new versions of Ma´laga
First re styling of Ibiza
mainly VW, with some Mediterranean touch
1989 Ibiza II Seat, with the VW’s platform
1990 Toledo VW: platform and core, high added value components=Seat: Chassis and
Mediterranean touch
3rd re styling of Polo VW
1991 Ibiza New Style Seat, with the VW’s platform
1992 Co´rdoba VW: platform and core, high added value components=Seat: Chassis and
‘Mediterranean touch’
1995 Inca VW: platform and core, high added value components=Seat: Chassis and
Mediterranean touch
1996 Alhambra Auto Europa, with high levels of involvement for Seat
1997 Arosa Mainly Seat, with a VW’s platform.
1998 New Toledo Mainly Seat, with a VW’s platform
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However, they differ not only in the form in which
their strategic alliances were initiated and how they
ended, but in the trajectory of their learning processes
as well.
In the Rover case, the official explanation for signing
the agreement with Honda was that it could be a route
for Rover to learning from Honda’s manufacturing
approaches. Nothing was said about learning how to
develop new products as the leading issue in forming the
alliance, but about the assembly of a Japanese model
while the Rover people, instead, get ready to launch the
Montego=Maestro model. In the Seat case Volkswagen
was chosen as a teacher partner with the main intention
of enlarging Seat’s product range by incorporating new
specialised vehicles as well as new key components,
installed in the new models or in updated versions of old
models, such as engines or transmissions.
Very soon after the start-up of the alliance with
Honda, Rover managers ‘... realised that the company
was to be in a situation where 70% of the car would be
bought-in’ (Schill et al., 1994, p. 262). They started
then to work hard in order to built vertical alliances in
those parts of the value-added chain that would link
and support the internal centres of excellence. Besides,
they tried to carefully select those components and
systems that customers perceive as important techno-
logical signals. As it is shown in Table 4, most of these
efforts ended up as body-styling and face-lifting of
Honda previous models, some minimal mechanical
alterations, and a very limited capability to design one
key component: the engine. Effectively, during the time
that the alliance was alive, Rover R&D departments
were able to design and manufacture six different
engines for the different versions of the Rover 200, 400,
and 800. Apart from that, Rover became more and
more involved in manufacturing badge products and in
‘roverising’ the Honda models. It forgot its initial
objective of achieving a ‘convergent development’
(Nakamura et al., 1996), which would allow the firm
to learn from Honda, while keeping its distinctive
competencies in engines and key components design
related activities. Consequently, when we analyse
whether or not Rover developed those core capabilities
linked to the new product design and development
processes, the available information is contradictory.
On the one hand, by the time the alliance ceased,
Rover was able to design a new car, the Rover 100, but
this model alone was not sufficiently profitable to save
the firm from red figures; it was capable of designing
some new engines as well. On the other hand, one
valuable capability that Rover has learnt from its
teacher partner is to tailor existing designs from other
manufacturers to produce ‘Roverised’ products.
These supposed learning achievements have not
being accompanied by financial success. As Pilkington
has already described (Pilkington, 1998), Rover was
completely unable to post any significant return during
its relationship with Honda.
Thus, we are facing a case where the financial
constraints were preventing a firm from emphasising
its R&D capabilities; the firm, lacking this financial
support looked for an alternative way to access the
required knowledge instead of its acquisition, and
signed an strategic alliance with a stronger partner.
The stronger partner never lost money with the
alliance, but the weaker was not able to say good-bye
to the red figures: from 1981 till 1993, Rover only got
profit figures, rather low figures, on five occasions.
Thus, a strange ‘divergent development’ effect took
place, wherein Rover forgot, or was forced to forget,
about the intention to learn Honda’s manufacturing
techniques and supplier relationships; it devoted most
of its capabilities to ‘roverise’ Honda models. As
Pilkington (1998, p. 7) points out: ‘...Whatever
strength of resolution Rover may have felt at the start
of its relationship with Honda, (it) was quickly lost as
the venture grew and developed, sapped by an ambitious
desire for more Honda models’.
As it concerns the Seat case, it is important to take
into account that VW’s strategy along the last two
decades has been an upgrading of the functions of its
core. This means the allocation of the manufacturing
of the core components, power train, suspension,
cockpits, engines, and platforms, in Wolfsburg. This
strategy explains why VW never helped Seat to
increase those of its core capabilities associated with
the design and development of the key components of
its vehicles. Thus, it is very likely that VW did not even
allow the Spanish firm to manufacture high value-
added elements, as a means of constraining the
potential development of some ‘learning by doing’
effect. So, we can consider the Seat and VW strategic
alliance as one of the type of ‘divergent development’
(Nakamura et al., 1996), since there was no techno-
logical overlap between Seat and Volkswagen during
its relationship. At that time, any kind of knowledge
and capabilities that Seat might have required for the
assembly of the badge models was accessed from VW.
Nevertheless, it is very important to remark that the
Spanish firm had a clearly defined strategy at the
moment of signing its agreement with VW. According
to such strategy, Seat was intended to design and
manufacture a model of its own. Seat acknowledged
that, in spite of the fact that it could afford such a goal
alone, the firm was aware of the fact that it will not
survive in the medium and long term with just one
model. Thereby, Seat recognised its strong need to
collaborate and to learn from a partner on the basis of
a long-term commitment.
According to the goals of its strategic corporate
plan, Seat launched the Ibiza model in 1984. For that
purpose, huge investments took place, which were
financed by the Spanish firm. It also participated very
actively in the upgrading of its facilities in order to
assembly the VW’s models included in the strategic
agreement. Six years later, the Toledo model was
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launched, and it combines the VW platform with a
‘Mediterranean’ design of its ‘hu¨t’. This is the first
example of how Seat increased its absorptive capacity,
i.e. its ability to value, assimilate, and apply knowledge
from a former learning alliance partner (Lane and
Lubatkin, 1998, p. 462); at the same time it grew
familiar with the set of organisational problems of
VW. This situation has been experienced again with
the launching of the Ibiza New Style (1991), and the
new model Co´rdoba (1992). Seat has also participated
in the design of the Inca (1995) and Alhambra models
(1996). Very recently, Seat has played a really
significant role in the design and manufacture of the
Arosa (1997) and New Toledo (1998) models. From
those achievements and developments we can infer that
a kind of ‘convergent development’ (Nakamura et al.,
1996) has happened to emerge. An interesting organi-
sational learning effect has taken place in Seat, which
may have been motivated by its strategic alliance with
VW as well as by the way Seat managed that alliance.
We can summarise from these cases that weaker,
student partners, can experience some organisational
learning linked to new product development processes
when some conditions take place. First, the weaker
firm has to have a clear strategy and not deviate from
it, as Seat did when it launched the Ibiza and kept it in
its production plans and products portfolio. Second,
the weaker firm should not concentrate on R&D
efforts devoted to key components of its products
unless these products already exist. Rover seems to
have put to much effort in designing engines, in spite of
the fact that Honda designs better engines that Rover
does, and that Rover did not have new models wherein
to place the new engines. In contrast, Seat concen-
trated its efforts in developing non-key components for
its VW’s badge models, a decision that proved to be
much more profitable in the long term. Thirdly, the
weaker partner should try to adapt itself to assemble
the models of the stronger partner just as the stronger
partner assembles them, instead of modifying the
models to adapt them to its own conditions. By acting
this way, not only is the weaker partner self-limiting its
learning possibilities, but it is also constraining the
success of its partner’s products. When this happens,
financial success is prevented, and the stronger partner
loses interest on the alliance. Seat tried very hard to
manufacture the VW’s models more cheaply and better
than those manufactured by VW itself. It succeeded in
this initiative, and VW’s interest in Seat did not
decrease. Unfortunately Rover faced some problems
when assembling the Japanese models, which helped to
diminish its probabilities to be acquired by Honda.
These facts are consistent with previous studies, which
suggest that learning improves the performance of the
students and makes the performance of both students
and teachers more reliable (March, 1991).
5. Managerial implications and suggestions for
further research
This study provides some guidelines for managers
when it comes to forming successful strategic alliances
with a view to developing the unique assets of the
companies involved. Forming the alliances needs to be
considered very carefully by the participating
companies.
The cases analysed here fulfil the prerequisites
suggested by Beamish and Inkpen (1995, p. 34) for
an alliance to become operational. Both Rover and
Seat enjoyed, prior to the venture, three broad areas of
knowledge: customer knowledge, manufacturing pro-
duct and process knowledge, and local operational
knowledge. From their analysis we can conclude that
the learning that takes place within alliances is more
complex than most literature on this topic suggests. In
particular, the outstanding problem we have analysed
in this article is that one where firms with weak
technological basis, lacking the financial resources
required to adequately invest in R&D processes, NPD
activities, etc., consider to substitute those investments
by the signing of a strategic technology alliance with a
teacher partner.
The existing literature does not help managers too
much in this decision making process. Firstly, most
studies consider that both partners enjoy the same
position along the alliance, thus leading to situations
where there are learning opportunities for the two
partners. Secondly, there is a scarcity of literature
considering the financial side of learning alliances,
which is like implicitly admitting that there are no
financial issues linked to this process. Thirdly, there are
Table 7. Competitive capabilities developed by Rover and Seat as results of their respective strategic alliances.
* Lower costs: due to the out sourcing practices and the collaborative manufacturing
* Technology transfer: new production methods were implemented, and new equipment was installed to manufacture both
the badge and own vehicles
* Quality improvement
* Cycle reduction: up to one third below the cycle time before the alliance
* Europeanisation: the distribution networks expanded notoriously in both cases
* Flexibility: both companies were able to fill very quickly their customers orders as a consequence of the high commonality
between the car components
* JIT procurement
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not many articles devoted to the analysis of failed
learning alliances, which may be taken as an indicator
of the good health of such kind of alliances. This
article’s position clearly differs from the existing
literature, and it is expected to help forge a better
alignment between academic descriptions and prescrip-
tions and the reality faced by managers.
First at all, it is worthwhile to remark that both
Rover and Seat developed some common competitive
capabilities as a consequence of their strategic alliances
with Rover and Honda. They are summarised in
Table 7.
The Rover and Seat cases also show that ‘teacher’
partners do limit the transfer of knowledge to their
‘student’ allies; this is to prevent ‘students’ ‘overtaking’
their ‘teachers’. Thus, the scope and length of the
learning process will be constrained by this. Whenever
the teacher partner is heavily focused on financial
performance issues, it will be less concerned with
reinforcing the learning processes of its students; the
students under such circumstances might by themselves
need to generate resources to compensate for that
effort. At such times the competitiveness of the teacher
cannot be eroded. The Rover case provides empirical
evidence for the Inkpen (1998, p. 227) suggestion that
in the face of poor alliance performance, the teacher
firm will become reluctant to commit to or even try out
proposals generated at the alliance level. Thus, while
poor performance can lead to myopia that acts as a
barrier to knowledge creation, the student partner may
feel that the alliance does not yield satisfactory
organisational performance because learning opportu-
nities have been unexploited. This was the feeling of
Rover managers when they sold the company to
BMW.
So, a student firm with financial problems that is
willing to learn from a teacher partner by means of a
strategic alliance should take into account that it will
only be allowed a limited learning opportunity. Some
of its assets may be taken as hostage by the teacher
partner. When trying to protect its assets, the student is
caught in a dilemma, whereby, as stated by Søfrensen
and Reve (1998, p. 151) ‘on the one hand it needs to
protect its own specific assets, and on the other it wishes
to share its assets in the strategic alliance’.
As the Seat case illustrates, the Spanish firm went on
with its goal of developing its own model, in spite of its
many difficulties, and even after signing the agreement
with VW. Its commitment allowed the firm to keep one
specific asset without compromising its relationships
with VW. Our results suggest the need for a richer
conceptual framework in considering the effects of
alliance activity on firm-specific knowledge and
capabilities. The article suggests a starting point for
further specialised research. For instance, our study
can be extended to the learning process of the British
and Spanish OEMs industries, to identify how their
new products and process development activities have
been affected by the technological dependence of some
of its main customers.
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